

## Exercise 6 in Cryptography - Proposed Solution -

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### Solution of Problem 16

Given: Alphabet  $\mathcal{A}$ , blocklength  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{A}^n = \mathcal{C}$ .  
 $\mathcal{A}^n$  describes all possible streams of  $n$  bits.

- a) An encryption is an injective function  $e_K : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ , with  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ .  
Fix key  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ . As  $e(\cdot, K)$  is injective, it holds:

- $\{e(M, K) \mid M \in \mathcal{M}\} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$
- $\{e(M, K) \mid M \in \mathcal{M}\} = \mathcal{M}$
- Since  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} \Rightarrow e(\mathcal{M}, K) = \mathcal{C}$  also surjective
- $\Rightarrow e(\mathcal{M}, K)$  is a bijective function.

A permutation  $\pi$  is a bijective (one-to-one) function  $\pi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ .  
 $\Rightarrow$  For each  $K$ , the encryption  $e(\cdot, K)$  is a permutation with  $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{A}^n$ .

- b) With  $\mathcal{A} = \{0, 1\} \Rightarrow |\mathcal{A}| = |\{0, 1\}| = 2$ , and  $n = 6$  there are  $N = 2^6 = 64$  elements.  
It follows that there are  $64! \approx 1.2689 \cdot 10^{89}$  different block ciphers.

### Solution of Problem 17

- a) Let us first take a look at Table 5.1 (Permutation Choice 1). Which bits are used to construct  $C_0$  and  $D_0$  from  $K_0$ ?

$C_0$  is constructed from:

- Bits 1, 2, 3 of the first 4 bytes, and
- bits 1, 2, 3, 4 of the last 4 bytes

$D_0$  is constructed from:

- Bits 4, 5, 6, 7 of the first 4 bytes, and
- bits 5, 6, 7 of the last 4 bytes

Note that this particular structure is also indicated by the given weak key.

This construction can also be seen in the following table:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$b_1$
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	$b_2$
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	$b_3$
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	$b_4$
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	$b_5$
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	$b_6$
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	$b_7$
57	58	59	60	61	62	63	$b_8$

$C_0 \uparrow$

$D_0 \uparrow$

When considering  $C_0$ , read columnwise (bottom to top) and from left to right. Table 5.1 (PC1) has exactly the same sequence, i.e., we have discovered a part of its construction principle. Similar steps are applied to construct  $D_0$ .

When regarding the bit-sequence of the given round key  $K_0 = 0x1F1F 1F1F 0E0E 0E0E$ , we now easily see that:

- All bits of  $C_0$  are 0, and all bits of  $D_0$  are 1.
- For the given  $C_0$  and  $D_0$ , cyclic shifting does not change the bits at all.  
 $\Rightarrow$  We obtain  $C_i = C_0$  and  $D_i = D_0$  for all rounds  $i = 1, \dots, 16$ .  
 $\Rightarrow$  All round keys are the same:  $K_1 = K_2 = \dots = K_{16}$ .
- Since decryption in DES is executing the encryption with round keys in reverse order, we observe that encryption acts identically to decryption for given weak key. Thus, a twofold encryption with the weak key, yields the original plaintext:

$$\text{DES}_K(\text{DES}_K(M)) = M \quad \forall M \in \mathcal{M}$$

- b) In order to find further weak keys, we intend to produce  $K_1 = K_2 = \dots = K_{16}$ . It suffices to generate  $C_0$  and  $D_0$  such that they contain only either zeros or ones only. In particular, we choose the bits  $K = XXXXYYYY$  with the first 4 bytes  $X$  and the last 4 bytes  $Y$  such that:

$$X = bbbcccc*, \quad Y = bbbbccc*, \quad b, c \in \{0, 1\}.$$

with  $*$  fulfilling the corresponding parity check condition. Then  $C_0$  and  $D_0$  become

$$C_0 = bb\dots b, \quad D_0 = cc\dots c$$

and it holds that

$$C_0 = C_n, \quad D_0 = D_n \quad \forall 0 \leq n \leq 16,$$

because  $C_n, D_n$  are created by a cyclic shift of  $C_0, D_0$  respectively.

The 4 weak keys are simply all possible cases of  $b, c \in \{0, 1\}$  with the proper parity bits:

$$\begin{aligned}
 K_1 &= 0x0101\ 0101\ 0101\ 0101, & b = c = 0, & \quad d = e = 1 \\
 K_2 &= 0x1F1F\ 1F1F\ 0E0E\ 0E0E, & b = 0, & \quad c = 1, \quad d = 1, \quad e = 0 \\
 K_3 &= 0xE0E0\ E0E0\ F1F1\ F1F1, & b = 1, & \quad c = 0, \quad d = 0, \quad e = 1 \\
 K_4 &= 0xFEFE\ FEFE\ FEFE\ FEFE, & b = c = 1, & \quad d = e = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

## Solution of Problem 18

a) Show the validity of the complementation property:  $\text{DES}(M, K) = \overline{\text{DES}(\overline{M}, \overline{K})}$ .

Consider each operation of the DES encryption for the complemented input. In order to track the impact of the complemented input, we will introduce auxiliary variables  $T_1, U_1, V_1, W_1$ .

- $\text{IP}(\overline{M}) = \overline{\text{IP}(M)} = (\overline{L_0}, \overline{R_0})$ , permutation does not affect the complement
- $\text{E}(\overline{R_0}) = \overline{\text{E}(R_0)} := \overline{T_1}$ , the doubled/expanded bits are also complemented
- $\overline{T_1} \oplus \overline{K_1} = T_1 \oplus K_1 := U_1$ , XOR ( $\oplus$ ) of complements is unchanged


We have: 

$\oplus$	0	1
0	0	1
1	1	0

 and for the complements: 

$\oplus$	$\overline{0}$	$\overline{1}$
$\overline{0}$	0	1
$\overline{1}$	1	0

- $\text{S}(U_1) := V_1$  is unchanged w.r.t. the non-complementary case
- $\text{P}(V_1) := W_1$  is unchanged w.r.t. the non-complementary case
- $W_1 \oplus \overline{L_0} = \overline{R_1}$ , next input is just complemented
- $L_1 = \overline{R_0} = \overline{L_1}$ , next input is just complemented
- $\Rightarrow$  Thus, we obtain  $\text{SBB}(\overline{R_1}, \overline{L_1}) = \overline{\text{SBB}(R_1, L_1)}$
- Analogous iterations for each  $i = 2, \dots, 16$ :  $(\overline{L_1}, \overline{R_1}) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow (\overline{L_{16}}, \overline{R_{16}})$
- $\text{IP}^{-1}(\overline{R_{16}}, \overline{L_{16}})$ , permutation does not affect the complement
- As a result,  $\text{DES}(\overline{M}, \overline{K}) = \overline{\text{DES}(M, K)} \checkmark$



- b) • In a brute-force attack, the amount of cases is halved since we can apply a chosen-plaintext attack with  $M$  and  $\overline{M}$ .

## Solution of Problem 19

$$\begin{pmatrix} r_0 \\ r_1 \\ r_2 \\ r_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x & (x+1) & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & x & (x+1) & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & x & (x+1) \\ (x+1) & 1 & 1 & x \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}^4 \quad (1)$$

It is to show that:

$$(c_3u^3 + c_2u^2 + c_1u + c_0)((x+1)u^3 + u^2 + u + x) \equiv \sum_{i=0}^3 r_i u^i \pmod{(u^4 + 1)}. \quad (2)$$

We expand the multiplication on the left hand side of (2), reduce it modulo  $u^4 + 1 \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}[u]$ , and use the abbreviations  $(r_0, r_1, r_2, r_3)'$  according to (1).

$$\begin{aligned} & (c_3u^3 + c_2u^2 + c_1u + c_0)((x+1)u^3 + u^2 + u + x) \\ &= c_3(x+1)u^6 + c_3u^5 + c_3u^4 + c_3xu^3 + \\ & \quad c_2(x+1)u^5 + c_2u^4 + c_2u^3 + c_2xu^2 + \\ & \quad c_1(x+1)u^4 + c_1u^3 + c_1u^2 + c_1xu + \\ & \quad c_0(x+1)u^3 + c_0u^2 + c_0u + c_0x \\ &= [c_3(x+1)]u^6 + [c_3 + c_2(x+1)]u^5 + [c_3 + c_2 + c_1(x+1)]u^4 \\ & \quad + [c_3x + c_2 + c_1 + c_0(x+1)]u^3 + [c_2x + c_1 + c_0]u^2 + [c_1x + c_0]u + c_0x. \end{aligned}$$

Now, we apply the modulo operation and merge terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \equiv [c_3x + c_2 + c_1 + (x+1)c_0]u^3 + [c_3(x+1) + c_2x + c_1 + c_0]u^2 + \\ & \quad [c_3 + c_2(x+1) + c_1x + c_0]u + [c_3 + c_2 + c_1(x+1) + c_0x] \\ & \stackrel{(1)}{\equiv} r_3u^3 + r_2u^2 + r_1u + r_0 \equiv \sum_{i=0}^3 r_i u^i \pmod{(u^4 + 1)} \end{aligned}$$