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## Exercise 13

### - Proposed Solution -

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#### **Solution of Problem 1**

As given, we have the parameters  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$  and  $a', b' \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Furthermore, we have  $M = ab - 1$ , the private key  $d = b'M + b$ , and the public key  $(n, e)$  with  $e = a'M + a$ , and  $n = \frac{ed-1}{M}$ . By substitution we obtain the following for  $n$ :

$$\begin{aligned} n &= \frac{ed - 1}{M} \\ &= \frac{(a'M + a)(b'M + b) - 1}{M} \\ &= \frac{a'b'M^2 + a'bM + ab'M + ab - 1}{M} \\ &= a'b'M + a'b + ab' + 1. \end{aligned}$$

- a)** The encryption operation is computing  $c \equiv em \pmod{n}$ . The decryption operation is computing  $dc \pmod{n}$ . From  $dc \equiv dem \pmod{n} \stackrel{!}{\equiv} m \pmod{n}$ , it follows that  $de \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  must hold:

$$\begin{aligned} de &\equiv (a'M + a)(b'M + b) \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv a'b'M^2 + ab'M + a'bM + ab \pmod{(a'b'M + ab' + ba' + 1)} \\ &\equiv 1 \pmod{(a'b'M + ab' + ba' + 1)}. \end{aligned}$$

For the given system,  $de \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  is always true.

- b)** We consider an attack to break the private key  $d$ . Note that  $c, n, e$  are public. Furthermore, since  $de \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$  holds, it follows that  $\gcd(de, n) = 1$ . We can compute the inverse of  $e$  modulo  $n$  using the Euclidean algorithm. As  $e^{-1} \equiv d \pmod{n}$  holds, the private key is easily computed using the Euclidean algorithm.

#### **Solution of Problem 2**

- a)** Apply the encryption function.

$$\begin{aligned} n &= p \cdot q = 199 \cdot 211 = 41989, \\ c &= e_K(32767) = m \cdot (m + B) \pmod{n} \\ &= 32767 \cdot (32767 + 1357) \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 16027 \pmod{41989} \end{aligned}$$

b) Start with the encryption function and solve for  $m$ .

$$\begin{aligned} c &\equiv m^2 + B \cdot m \pmod{n} \\ c + \left(\frac{B}{2}\right)^2 &\equiv m^2 + B \cdot m + \left(\frac{B}{2}\right)^2 \pmod{n} \\ c + \left(\frac{B}{2}\right)^2 &\equiv \left(m + \frac{B}{2}\right)^2 \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, the multiplicative inverse of 2 modulo  $n$  is calculated as  $2^{-1} \equiv 20995 \pmod{41989}$ . With

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{c} &:= c + \left(\frac{B}{2}\right)^2 \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv 16027 + (1357 \cdot 20995)^2 \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv 4013 \pmod{n}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{m} &:= m + \frac{B}{2} \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv m + 1357 \cdot 20995 \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv m + 21673 \pmod{n}, \end{aligned}$$

we can conclude

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{c} &\equiv \tilde{m}^2 \pmod{n} \\ 4013 &\equiv \tilde{m}^2 \pmod{n}. \end{aligned}$$

This form is the standard Rabin Cryptosystem. In order to find the square root modulo  $n$ , we use Proposition 9.4. First, find

$$1 = \underbrace{s \cdot p}_{=:b} + \underbrace{t \cdot q}_{=:a}$$

using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

$$\begin{aligned} 211 &= 1 \cdot 199 + 12 \\ 199 &= 16 \cdot 12 + 7 \\ 12 &= 1 \cdot 7 + 5 \\ 7 &= 1 \cdot 5 + 2 \\ 5 &= 2 \cdot 2 + 1 \\ \Rightarrow 1 &= 5 - 2 \cdot 2 \\ &= 5 - 2 \cdot (7 - 1 \cdot 5) = 3 \cdot 5 - 2 \cdot 7 \\ &= 3 \cdot (12 - 1 \cdot 7) - 2 \cdot 7 = 3 \cdot 12 - 5 \cdot 7 \\ &= 3 \cdot 12 - 5 \cdot (199 - 16 \cdot 12) = 83 \cdot 12 - 5 \cdot 199 \\ &= 83 \cdot (211 - 1 \cdot 199) - 5 \cdot 199 = 83 \cdot 211 - 88 \cdot 199 \\ \Rightarrow b &= -88 \cdot 199 = -17512 \\ a &= 83 \cdot 211 = 17513 \end{aligned}$$

Next, we calculate the square roots modulo  $p$  and  $q$  (this is Proposition 9.3).

$$\begin{aligned} x^2 &\equiv 4013 \equiv 33 \pmod{p} \\ \Rightarrow x_1 &= 33^{\frac{p+1}{4}} = 33^{50} \equiv 86 \pmod{199} \\ x_2 &= -x_1 \equiv 113 \pmod{199}, \\ y^2 &\equiv 4013 \equiv 4 \pmod{q} \\ \Rightarrow y_1 &= 4^{\frac{q+1}{4}} = 4^{53} \equiv 209 \pmod{211} \\ y_2 &= -y_1 = 2 \pmod{211} \end{aligned}$$

Then,  $f_{x_i, y_j} = ax_i + by_j$  are solutions to  $f^2 = 4013 \pmod{n}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} f_{x_1, y_1} &= a \cdot x_1 + b \cdot y_1 \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv 17513 \cdot 86 - 17512 \cdot 209 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 36503 - 6965 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 29538 \pmod{41989} \\ f_{x_1, y_2} &= 17513 \cdot 86 - 17512 \cdot 2 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 36503 - 35024 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 1479 \pmod{41989} \\ f_{x_2, y_1} &= 17513 \cdot 113 - 17512 \cdot 209 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 5486 - 6965 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 40510 \equiv -f_{x_1, y_2} \pmod{41989} \\ f_{x_2, y_2} &= 17513 \cdot 113 - 17512 \cdot 2 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 5486 - 35024 \pmod{41989} \\ &\equiv 12451 \equiv -f_{x_1, y_1} \pmod{41989} \end{aligned}$$

With

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{m}^2 &\equiv \tilde{c} \pmod{n} \\ \tilde{m} &\equiv f_{x_i, y_j} \pmod{n} \\ m_{x_i, y_j} + 21673 &\equiv f_{x_i, y_j} \pmod{n} \\ m_{x_i, y_j} &\equiv f_{x_i, y_j} - 21673 \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

the four possible messages can now be calculated.

$$\begin{aligned} m_{x_1, y_1} &= 29538 - 21673 \equiv 7865 \pmod{n} \\ m_{x_1, y_2} &= 1479 - 21673 \equiv 21795 \pmod{n} \\ m_{x_2, y_1} &= 40510 - 21673 \equiv 18837 \pmod{n} \\ m_{x_2, y_2} &= 12451 - 21673 \equiv 32767 \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Message  $m_{x_2, y_2}$  is the original one, but, knowing only the cryptogram and the private key, this message cannot be identified as the original one.

## Solution of Problem 3

In the ElGamal verification  $v_1 \equiv v_2 \pmod{p}$  needs to be fulfilled.

Recall that  $y = a^x \pmod{p}$  and  $r = a^k \pmod{p}$  are used:

$$\begin{aligned} y^r r^s &\equiv a^{h(m)} \pmod{p} \\ \Leftrightarrow a^{xr} a^{ks} &\equiv a^{h(m)} \pmod{p} \\ \stackrel{\text{Fermat}}{\Leftrightarrow} xr + ks &\equiv h(m) \pmod{p-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Now, we expand both sides of the congruence with  $h(m)^{-1}h(m')$ :

$$xr \cdot h(m)^{-1}h(m') + ks \cdot h(m)^{-1}h(m') \equiv h(m)h(m)^{-1}h(m') \equiv h(m') \pmod{p-1} \quad (1)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow xr' + ks' \equiv h(m') \pmod{p-1} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \stackrel{\text{Fermat}}{\Leftrightarrow} a^{xr'} a^{ks'} &\equiv a^{h(m')} \pmod{p} \\ \Leftrightarrow y^{r'} r^{s'} &\equiv a^{h(m')} \pmod{p} \\ \stackrel{!}{\Leftrightarrow} y^{r'} (r')^{s'} &\equiv a^{h(m')} \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

The equivalence assumption in the last line holds if  $r \equiv r' \pmod{p}$ .

**Note:** In the ElGamal scheme, the condition  $1 \leq r < p$  must be checked!

From (1) and (2), we have  $rh(m)^{-1}h(m') \equiv r' \pmod{p-1}$ .

We have to solve the following system of two congruences w.r.t.  $r'$ :

$$\begin{aligned} r' &\equiv rh(m)^{-1}h(m) \pmod{p-1}, \\ r' &\equiv r \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

By means of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we get the parameters:

$$\begin{aligned} a_1 &= r \pmod{p}, & a_2 &= rh(m)^{-1}h(m') \pmod{p-1}, \\ m_1 &= p, & m_2 &= p-1, \\ M_1 &= p-1, & M_2 &= p, \\ y_1 &= M_1^{-1} \equiv p-1 \pmod{p}, & y_2 &= M_2^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}, \\ M &= p(p-1). \end{aligned}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem leads to the solution:

$$\begin{aligned} r' &= \sum_{i=1}^2 a_i M_i y_i = r(p-1)^2 + rh(m)^{-1}h(m')p \\ &\equiv r(p^2 - p - p + 1 + h(m)^{-1}h(m')p) \\ &\equiv r(p(p-1) - p + 1 + h(m)^{-1}h(m')p) \\ &\equiv r(h(m)^{-1}h(m')p - p + 1) \pmod{M}. \end{aligned}$$

The forged signature

$$(r', s') = (r(h(m)^{-1}h(m')p - p + 1) \pmod{M}, sh(m)^{-1}h(m') \pmod{(p-1)})$$

is a valid signature of  $h(m')$ , if  $1 \leq r < p$  is not checked.